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word, and the wave of *satisfaction* (cœnesthetic feeling) follows, kept down in its intensity, however, by the strange 'appearance' of the erstwhile familiar word. It will be noted that now interest and attention start all over again on the new problem: How to make that word Achilles seem natural. It might be possible to trace the exact stages of this new conative series, but I regret to say that I did not observe it closely enough to give a real photograph of the process. And in this study, whatever may be thought of the analysis, I am anxious for the record of the facts to be kept straight.

In spite of appearing to hang heavy conclusions on a weak string of fact, and despite the show of a 'system' that may make some of the judicious grieve, I may be pardoned if I summarize my analysis by putting together in parallel columns the kinds of mental stuff that seem to me to go together in the three phases above mentioned.[1]

First Stage.	Second Stage.	Third Stage.
Specific sensation images (sight)	Muscular sensation	Organic sensation
Somesthetic feeling (exaltation)	Kinesthetic feeling (fear)	Cœnesthetic feeling (pleasure)
Assimilation	Imitation	Imagination
Attention	Endeavor	Pursuit
Interest	Belief	Anticipation

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SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A PSYCHOGENETIC THEORY OF MIND

FROM the scientific standpoint, the problem of psychogenesis is capable of fairly definite statement. Baldwin[1] insists that it is concerned exclusively with the question of development. Dewey[2] holds that it has to do with the instrumental character of consciousness. These two views are not opposed, although they involve a somewhat different line of approach to the problems of mind. They are differentiated by Hobhouse,[3] who recognizes them as related topics of a single subject. Passing by the question of the ultimate nature of mind, this writer remarks that mind is, by him, taken 'as a factor in organic evolution,' and he contents himself with 'pointing out certain more primitive factors of which it is the natural development.' By the evolution of mind he means the consideration of the growing complexity of the relations within consciousness through which new functions are assumed. But the growth or evolution of mind can not be shown except as we analyze out at each step forward what is peculiar to that stage. Hence, in its most general statement, the problem of psychogenesis is to arrange a series of steps or to mark out the epochs through which mind passes from its most primitive to its more developed forms.

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[1] For further notes on the terms here used see 'Snap Shot of an Association Series' in Vol. III., p. 435, of this Journal; also 'Snap Shot of a Dream Drama,' in Vol. III., p. 705.

[1] 'Mental Development.'

[2] 'Studies in Logical Theory.'

[3] 'Mind in Evolution.'

The question of method is important because it affects our conception of the subject, and because it emphasizes differences between workers in the same field. Although Hobhouse, for example, agrees with Baldwin in his aim, namely, to trace the evolution of mind, there are differences between these writers as to the limits which this aim imposes. Baldwin starts within the field of biological facts and relations, and his task, consequently, becomes pressing at the point where the growth in the structure and function of living beings becomes so complex that there is little to mark off the field of the psychological from that of the physiological. It is significant that the 'origin of consciousness,' in the sense of a genetic progression, becomes, for him, an important consideration, and we are told that 'the rise of consciousness . . . would seem to be due to the influence of (certain specified) vital stimulations,' which are vital or necessary in the sense that they 'must have come to the particular organism by heredity.'[4] Hobhouse, on the other hand, takes mind as a factor in organic evolution and he is only concerned to point out the conditions of its appearance. He puts aside the question of 'its origin in the organic world' and concentrates attention upon its evolution 'in the sense of that unrolling of its full nature which is what evolution most strictly means.'[5] Connected with this difference is another which is important. It is, in the words of Hobhouse, whether mind is to be investigated as it 'is felt to be by its possessor,' or whether we are to be occupied 'with its operations as apparent to an onlooker.' The former is akin to, if it is not in part identical with, Baldwin's 'dynamogenic method,' but it is the latter which Hobhouse adopts for himself. A consequence of this distinction is that Hobhouse gives us a more objective treatment of the material—a detailed statement of cases, and their analysis, with a view to disengaging essential elements. This course recommends itself because we are enabled to keep clear

[4] 'Mental Development,' p. 197 ff.

[5] 'Mind in Evolution,' p. 5.

of the danger of reading exclusively the later in terms of the earlier, a danger which is particularly subtile when we pass from organic to psychic phenomena, and because, at the same time, we guard against surreptitiously introducing into the earlier what we want to get out of the later. When a writer has both a biological and a psychological interest, it is difficult for him to steer between these respective dangers. It is not clear that Baldwin has escaped either peril. For example, his use of the term imitation to cover any number of facts of the circular type without respect to the question of their organic or psychological character, gets one across many gaps before they have come in sight. But whether we can trace the progression throughout from any lower to the next higher stage, we can mark out with some degree of certainty the more important levels of mental development, which then become subject to more accurate description and careful analysis..

It will serve to bring the following suggestions into a single point of view if a word or two is said about consciousness. We agree with Baldwin when he says that psychology is concerned with the psychophysical individual. By a psychophysical individual we understand one whose coordinated movements take place with a view to effect, maintain and develop such relations with the environment as shall have a survival value. Consciousness is the term which we use to indicate this fact. There are, so far as we are able to discover, no facts which are called conscious which lose this characteristic. If this is what Brentano, following a suggestion of Kant, means by 'reference to an object,' our relations, in this regard, are sufficiently indicated. But what these statements enable us to emphasize is that psychology as a science of consciousness is *eo ipso* a science of concrete facts. The development of this science, then, would consist in describing the various typical situations in which the psychophysical individual may come, the various kinds of reference or outerness which are involved, and the points of starting of the processes of reference. No modification of this statement seems necessary, as is sometimes supposed, when the ethical, esthetical and religious experiences become the subjects of psychological description. To carry out the program just intimated would be to write an account of mental development in all its aspects. We shall confine ourselves to a single object, namely, to describe certain characteristic stages in the growth of mind with a view to pointing out the principles which control them.

There seem to be four closely related steps in the evolution of mind, to which we may give the names attention, suggestion, imitation and imagination. These we consider briefly in turn.

1. *Attention.*—This may be defined, in accord with our conception

of the nature of consciousness, as the *primary* reaction of a psychophysical individual to its environment. The environment may be regarded as the occasion of the arousal of certain congenital impulses which, without further direction, run their course, and terminate in the appropriate adjustment. Instances of this may be found in the first pecking of a chick and the suckling of a mammal. Here the individual does what he is fitted, by inheritance, to do. But he does not do it, as some psychologists seem to think, *in vacuo*. The environment is an essential factor of the observed phenomenon. Even from the observational standpoint, and we should think from the side of the experiencing subject also, the experience is so obviously one that we can not tell where the psychophysiological process ends and the psychophysical adjustment begins.

There are other instances where attention does not come about under the direction of inheritance, but quite accidentally, as it were. One might say, however, that even in the class of cases mentioned there is always an element of chance. In every instance where there is an absence of parental guidance this is so, and parental guidance, as in the case of the human infant, does not avoid, but only reduces the probability of a miscarriage of the aroused impulse. Thus Lloyd Morgan observed that the young chick at first would peck at anything of appropriate size. I have also observed that young kittens will suck at their mother without regard to the source of their food.[6] In these cases, as in all others which belong to the same class, there is no inherited discrimination of what will satisfy the need which gets expressed in the impulse. In the other instances chance operates in another way. In the case of a congenital impulse there is no danger that the movement will not take place, the chance is that it will miss the appropriate mark. In those we have now in mind, the chance is that the movement will not be made, or that it will be made subordinately to some other project. In the former alternative, the phenomenon we are considering will not appear; in the latter, only if the movement is inhibitory enough to put an end to the main process do we have a case in point. The accidents of childhood, and the risks and dangers of the young of all species, are in evidence. One illustration from Kidd's recent book on 'Savage Childhood' must suffice (pp. 60, 61). "By accident," he writes, "the hand of the baby (a Kafir child of about a year old) came into contact with the hot lid of the pot; the hand was withdrawn at once—evidently by reflex action, for the child was not disturbed in its reverie . . . The child showed no conscious perception of its action. The attention of the child was called away to something happening in another part of the hut, when again its hand accidentally touched the hot lid of the pot. This time the child withdrew the hand more quickly, as though it had a vague and dawning consciousness that something had gone wrong somewhere. The child evidently did not grasp the fact that the painful sensation was caused by the contact of the finger with the hot iron. But, to judge from the expression on the face, a dim suspicion that this might possibly account for the sensation dawned on the child, for after a few moments of meditation, the baby, evidently with the idea of inquiry, put out its first finger and deliberately touched the pot. Having done this, it as deliberately withdrew its hand and looked at its finger in surprise; it then looked at the pot and seemed puzzled. . . . No sooner had the child recovered from this expression of surprise than it deliberately put out its finger against the lid of the pot. A short period elapsed in which nerve currents were traveling to the brain and were being sorted out in that very dull quarter, and then the baby set up a piteous howl and was promptly seized by its mother, who removed it from the danger zone.''

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[6] One kitten I knew, after it was taken from its mother and had learned to eat solid food, would, when taken on the lap, settle down with its nose against the person, take a portion of the dress into its mouth, and, if allowed to do so, suck at the dry goods until quite moist, accompanying this with gentle alternate pressing with the front paws in proximity to the dress stuff.

This illustration is useful for more than showing the primitive character of the attention attitude; it helps us to see the process going on by which we pass beyond this primary attention to what is hardly distinguishable from perception. It also helps us to appreciate what perhaps the first illustrations would not, that attention may be viewed not only as a matter of adjustment, but also as a matter of something-which-merely-is. We have here something akin to James's 'pure experience.' The term might be appropriate enough were it not for the misunderstanding arising from the historical associations of 'pure.' We are accustomed to describe the phenomena in question as 'concrete experience.' Hobhouse, however, uses the same term for the objects which are given in perception, and which, with him, we should agree to call 'articulate' experience, if articulate meant something more than concrete.[7] We do not insist upon terms; we only wish to indicate, what is the fact at this stage, that what has above been called outerness is at its maximum, that there is no discrimination between subject and object, that we have an unformulated feeling-of-something. That this is not just theory, we may refer to some experimental data published a year or so ago in the *Psychological Review*, N.S., Vol. XII. See especially pp. 175, 176 and remarks on p. 193 f.

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[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

2. *Suggestion.*—We have stated elsewhere that by suggestion is meant 'a clue developed in normal mental process which becomes controlling in the further development of that process.' It is a principle of subjective control in the sense that it originates within, and in consequence of, the processes which are involved in carrying out the impulses which are characteristic of attention. Baldwin has shown that the primary adjustments with which we are concerned in the previous section are due to heightened central processes aroused by vitally appropriate stimuli; attention is motived by a distinctively pleasure-pain experience. The object fits in with the desire, and gives direction to it; the desire prompts to those movements through which it comes to an end in the appropriation of its object. The necessity by which attention is possible only through movement is the condition both of maintaining the continuity of mental life and of marking out the distinction between attention and suggestion. Attention is, phylogenetically, the satisfaction of desire; it runs a definite course, and comes to an end in specified adjustments. It is necessarily characterizd by fluctuation, it is also intermittent. But the movements which are instrumental to it give rise to a new class of experience which works within the original feeling-impulses to give them greater definiteness.[8]

Now, we may say that it is the way in which the involved kinesthetic sensations function in modifying and directing the feeling-impulses that characterizes the stage of mental development we have called suggestion. This is expressed in a general way by saying, as we have stated it elsewhere, that 'conscious processes develop their own suggestions, which act as clues to the meaning of experience.' This is another way of stating, what was said above, that suggestion is a principle of subjective control. Experience which has meaning has gained that meaning at the expense of the concrete outwardness which it had at the start. If, therefore, we are right in considering suggestion as a stage in the development of meaning, it must be, at the same time, a means by which outwardness is overcome, and at least the illusion of inwardness is produced. This is what we find. The original experience becomes *accessible*, and this is effected through the modification of feeling by the kinesthetic sensations which arise in connection with the movements which are directed toward the satisfaction of the feeling-impulse. An illustration will make this clear. There is nothing which seems to us more inward than our aches and pains. The psychologists also tell us—doubtfully, we think—that our feelings are the most unsharable and individual experiences we have. No European or American would localize his headache, *e. g.*, anywhere else than in his own head. Hence nothing seems less necessary to inwardizing than movement and strain sensations. But if we go to the more primitive man, this would not seem to be the case. On the testimony of 'one of the most intelligent Kafirs' he knew, Kidd reports this man's recollection of his first headache during childhood. "He said he was conscious," Kidd writes, "that something was wrong somewhere, but did not dream that the pain was in his head. The pain might just as well have been in the roof of his hut as in the roof of his head; and it was only when his mother told him that his head was aching that this fact dawned upon him."[9] We quote the instance for the purpose of showing the possibility of taking what we have called an attentive attitude toward feeling experience, and other cases might be quoted. The way in which this child came to a more intimate acquaintance with his headache belongs to a later stage than we have as yet reached, it belongs under imagination, which involves ideal control. But if we turn back to the account of the baby mentioned under 'attention,' we will readily see that the series of movements by which his finger came, accidentally and purposely, into contact with the hot pot was an important factor in developing the pain consciousness which overflowed into the 'piteous howl' which brought his mother to the rescue.

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[8] From the standpoint of the fixation of attention, the following from Ladd's 'Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory' (p. 67—italics mine) is pertinent: "The feeling of holding our organs steady seems to form no unimportant part of the support which the mind receives in its effort to give fixed attention. Now, it is by fixation of attention that the striated muscle connected with the organs both of sense and of motion is put into this condition of physiological tension. It is *the return feeling of this tension* which defines still further the character, and serves as the continuous support, of our act of attention."

One other point remains to be mentioned. We have seen that in any *subsequent* act of attention the several paths are more permeable because they have become specialized through complication with the returning processes set up by movements involved in adjustment. The organism gets out to the object more surely. It does so under the stimulus of the sensations of movement which come in to define the course which leads to the desired end. But in facilitating the course of attention it, at the same time, introduces the condition which makes the definition of the object possible. Care, however, has to be exercised that too much be not attributed, at this point, to suggestion. The danger is that just as the function of suggestion has been read back into attention, so the function of imitation will be read back into suggestion. Baldwin seems to have done so when he speaks of 'suggestive imitation.' Bolton is also open to the same criticism in so far as he identifies perception with kinesthetic sensation. The process underlying suggestion, we have said, is for the furtherance of attention, it is to make the paths outward permeable. It is not to define the object, but to make the object accessible. But in doing this, it, of course, defines the object, but not as an object, not, as we should say, objectively; the object, the rather, is defined as a means for the satisfaction of a desire, and if there is a judgment, it is not theoretical, it is a value-judgment. In other words, we do not, at this stage, reach a perception. What we have is a sensation object, for, as Baldwin says,[10] 'sensation enables us to react upon facts according to their immediate worth to the organism.'[11]

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[9] 'Savage Childhood,' pp. 61, 62.

3. *Imitation.*—Imitation is the process by which an external conditioning object which has become accessible in suggestion becomes the starting-point of a new function which, working in the reverse direction, makes a further determination of the object possible. It involves a principle of objective control in the sense that the object is now no longer a means to the satisfaction of desire, but becomes independent, that is, something to which the sensori-motor process has to be adjusted. In the case of the newly hatched chick, for example, more importance attaches, at first, to the edible material than to the inedible. At the level of development where food-supply is largely dependent upon the individual's powers of successful foraging, mental blindness to the negligible is a negative factor in emphasizing that definition of instinct which is brought about through motor reaction, and by which certain things come to be 'selected' as food material. But it is not obvious that what, from this point of view, is not positively important never becomes so. It is difficult to see how any development of mental powers could take place if the failure to satisfy an instinct resulted in every case in mental blindness to that class of things. It is, on the other hand, conceivable that the disappointment of a feeling-impulse may be an important element in the training of which the organism is capable. We have a suggestion of this in what are called protective phenomena. For here the conditions are exactly the reverse of those which determine the animal in the search for food. In the search for food, it is important to have an eye for the useful; protective reactions, on the contrary, depend upon an eye for the harmful. Thus, while chicks are blind to other chicks, they are put into a flutter at the approach of a human being or any other large and

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[10] 'Mental Development,' p. 291.

[11] For further data and remarks on this section the reader is referred to the *Psychological Review*, Vol. XI., pp. 267–269, 275, 276, 278–281; Vol. XII., pp. 183, 191–193.

moving object. This, of course, is, as much as pecking, an instinctive reaction; but it is important to remark that it functions through fear—a pain experience—and it inhibits the pecking instinct which is of the opposite, hedonic quality. How far the pecking and protective experiences fuse into one we are unable to say; but what we know is that they are capable of considerable modification, as every one who has kept chickens can testify. The fact to which we direct attention is that suggestion, which works within the original limits of instinct, and gives definiteness to it, gets modified under certain conditions so that the behavior of the animal is reconstructed in important particulars.

Modification of behavior is dependent upon the breaking up of habit. But no established mode of reaction can be diverted from its accustomed course except by the introduction of new factors, which, entering in, complicate the problem for future behavior. Have we any new elements at this stage which were not present in suggestion? It may be pointed out that at the level of suggestion we have Baldwin's circular-reaction, by which the useful or the pleasant tends to get itself accepted and repeated. For him, this is imitation. But if so, it is imitation in a novel sense, and everything in the psychophysical life, from the reflex gurglings and cooings of the infant up to and including the political and religious beliefs of the man, is imitative. It seems better to confine the term to narrower limits. Thus, for example, the pecking of the chick is imitative only to the observer, and because there are other chickens in the same environment doing this very thing. But the feeding of an infant is not imitative even in this sense, unless, perchance, it is a case of twins and they are both fed at once. Imitation, we should agree with Stout, 'is the impulse to perform an action which arises from the perception of it as performed by another.' It is for the first time 'present and operative at the perceptual level.'[12] But if this is so, it must belong to a later than the suggestive stage of mental development. Whence we have this insight, namely, that imitation is a twofold process in which not only the object comes to articulate definition, but the means are developed through which new adjustments, in the form of modified behavior, are made possible. If, now, we return to the question raised above,—namely, what it is that arrests an established reaction,—we can look for our answer nowhere else than to the object itself. The object as defined for suggestion is a sensept—a pleasure-giving thing. It is on its way to becoming a percept, a thing in its own rights, so to say, when, by ceasing to afford satisfaction to our subjective needs, it is able to disengage itself from the control of suggestion and to supply material which either was not present or was overlooked at the former level. It is, no doubt, the development of specialized sensory areas which makes possible the complication of the psychophysical processes which result in perception. But the specialized organs are, at the same time, the means which have grown in dependence upon the pressure of environment through which sensory material is fed in and becomes the clue to the nature of things. Things, then, are not merely things which exist in their relation to me, they are things into relation with which I must come if I am to exist at all. What we may, therefore, say is that the larger amount of sensory material which is in evidence at this stage introduces a change in the feeling state in which, under the guidance of suggestion, attention issues, and is the condition on which the sensept passes over into and becomes a percept.

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[12] 'Manual of Psychology,' pp. 270, 269.

It was necessary to indicate how perception is involved in, and is the outcome of the process of, imitation because current definitions of imitation presuppose the existence of 'copy,' and do not see that to give rise to imitation this 'copy' must not only be attended to but perceived. This, of course, grows out of the relation between attention and perception, by which it is supposed that perception is the more elementary and conditioning process. If, however, what we have said carries any weight, this relation has to be reversed. It is, for us, not true, as a question of development, that we attend to what we perceive, but the fact seems to be that we perceive what we attend to. This view affects the relations which we presume to hold between imitation and perception. They are phenomena, we believe, which arise at the same level of development, and, indeed, are to be considered as differentiations within a single growth era. They indicate different features of the objectification which takes place in building up the spatial world. It should be tolerably clear from what has already been said that perception is a process of altered adjustment to changes in the conditions by which experience is determined. But alteration of adjustment is imperative at the time of the change in the conditions, and is, therefore, only another aspect of the same fact. But when we look at the matter a little more closely, it becomes obvious that we can not define imitation in essentially different terms. It, too, is an adjustment to environment, and has the same end as all adjustment, namely, its appropriation.[13] If in perception the object or situation is apprehended in a way which emphasizes its independent or uncontrolled character, imitation is only a further specification of the same fact. The point need not be labored because current literature furnishes ample illustration. Imitation is, then, a term for a special class of perceptions, for those, namely, through my adjustment to which the perceived world comes to be differentiated into two subclasses—object-things and subject-things. Each of these controls behavior in definite ways, but it is only in regard to the latter that behavior can be called imitative.

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[13] Above we said that in suggestion the object was made accessible. We use the term appropriation in the present connection to indicate the change in the character of the adjustment which imitation implies.

With regard to this latter we may remark that it arises in a different environment from the former. The objective factors may be marked off as corresponding, broadly, to what we call the 'natural' and the 'social.' In customary terms we perceive what exists in space; we imitate what exists in time. But what we have indicated is that our reactions in these two cases are not psychologically different, and they terminate in the same cognitive act. They belong together at the same stage of mental development because they are significant of the same cognitive effort. What imitation aims at, and what perception strives after, is the ascertainment of the common, permanent qualities and relations of the object by which each is controlled, and to which the knowing mind is required to adjust itself. But just as we fail of perception when the object is the center of conflicting or contradictory predicates, so in imitation the common-to-you-and-me is seized upon and made permanent. This may be emphasized by saying that imitation is of as much importance to society as to the individual. It is interested in getting those things done which are characteristic of the group. It, therefore, paves the way and stimulates by social pressure the motor reactions in which the individual reproduces the common activities and sentiments of the whole. In this sense, imitation is a term which is appropriately applied to this class of reactions from the objective standpoint. But when this standpoint is changed, what we have to notice is that it is through these induced motor activities the individual comes to know the subject-things with which his own life is so intimately bound up. We can hardly say that the child imitates; what he does is to follow out the impulses which the social environment releases within him, and in this way arrives at a perception of his social *milieu*. Imitation, in other words, works through the congenital instincts which have become defined in suggestion for the purpose of leading the individual on the basis of his motor reactions to a perception of the class of objects which have been called subject-things.[14]

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[14] Data and remarks bearing on the topics in this section will be found in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII., pp. 197–206; this JOURNAL, Vol. III., pp. 404–407.

4. *Imagination.*—By imagination we may mean either the fact that, or the process by which, behavior is determined by ideas. Ideas have this important characteristic, that they belong to both sides of the contrasted halves of experience through which we have traced the development of mind—to the subject of the experience and to the world of the experienced. Usage indicates this, as, for example, when Külpe calls memory, imagination, etc., 'centrally excited sensations,'[15] and other writers refer to them as re-productive or re-presentative phenomena. This is what we should expect if our statement of the developmental process is correct; for what we have seen is that, beginning with an experience in which the factors are undifferentiated, the connections between them have been worked in both directions—from within, out, as in suggestion; and from without, in, as in imitation. Consequently, what we should look for in imagination is that the inner and the outer processes should be combined in a way which gives rise to a new objectivity as characteristic of the new level of mental life which the term indicates. We get some support for this expectation from the probable physiological conditions which underlie mental reproduction. We are led to believe that both central and peripheral processes are concerned in all representation. And if this view comes to prevail, what we may look for is that imagination will be the starting-point of a new development through which a differentiation of inner and outer similar to that which we have noticed, but at a higher level, will be brought about, and that in these higher developments science, art and religion will be seen to spring from a common root in the mental constitution of the race.

In treating of imagination, it is usual to separate out memory in a way which gives the impression that it stands in a unique position. The historical reason for this goes back to Hume, who feels free to refer to the phenomena of memory indifferently as ideas and impressions.[16] There seems no good reason for continuing this usage, and we prefer not only, with Sully,[17] to include memory and imagination under the single term imagination, but to extend its application to the whole developmental epoch which is based on any and every degree of reproduction. Imagination, then, is a term which does not denote a single faculty, but a group of faculties which is in developmental continuity with the earlier stages which have received mention.[18] If, however, we wish to point out what distinguishes imagination from these earlier stages, we should say that it implies a principle of ideal control through which its various constructions are carried out. This may be illustrated in two directions, each standing for a definite stage in the development of imagination.

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[15] 'Outlines of Psychology,' pp. 169–275.

[16] 'Treatise,' Bk. I., Pt. III., Sec. 5; cf. Bk. I., Pt. I., Sec. 3.

[17] 'The Human Mind,' Vol. I., p. 277 ff.

[18] The extent of the term imagination is implicated in current philosophical discussions. From the standpoint of the text, the question between pragmatists

We said above that imitation referred primarily to that group of percepts which were called subject-things (Baldwin's personal projects). It was also pointed out that the intractable—experiences which are not controlled by us—were significant for future growth. It is not surprising, consequently, if we find in the other percept group—the object-things—the starting-point of the development of imagination. In this class of objects we discover what is psychogenetically the *point d'appui* of perception and imagination. From this point of view, imagination is an indirect method of overcoming the otherness which is insisted on by object-things.[19] Let us take a simple illustration, namely, finding one's way about successfully in the dark. To find one's way about in the daylight one must, of course, have a practical acquaintance with the situation of objects and with the resistance of objects. The problem is the same at night, only its solution is greatly hindered by the absence of the conditions of clear perception. Now, among primitive men night work is not unusual, and if it is not essential to their safety, it is an important factor in their economic well-being. In this connection it has been pointed out that there is a remarkable development of the sense functions. This may be admitted without interfering with the contrast between night and day, and with the differences in the appearance of objects in consequence of this contrast. The darker the night, that is, the more completely perception was interfered with, the more successful would the enterprise promise to be, provided that the party could find its way without blundering against every obstacle in the bush or forest. Here, then, is a situation which made some substitute for perception imperative. Imagination, in its first stage as the image-making faculty, is exactly what is needed, for the tribe which, in plunging into the darkness, did not lose hold on the distinctions and directions of broad day would have a distinctly survival value. Imagination would, thus, come to have a practical relation to the life of the race; and we have it with us to-day as a selection because it appeared among our progenitors as an advantageous variation.[20]

and idealists is this: whether thought introduces a new epoch in mental development, or whether what thought is and does is explicable by reference to the principles which are functional in imagination.

[19] This remark also applies to subject-things in so far as they are also object-things. But it is to be noted that imitation does not rest upon this feature, but upon the fact that they are not entirely predictable.

[20] It is not the distinction between perception and imagination which is, at

Ideas do not differ from images in the fact that they are less concrete and sensuous, but in the fact that they give control over a different part of the perceptual world. Images, we have seen, are developed under the obscuring conditions of vanishing light (we need only to consider visual images) from object-things, and are the means by which we retain contact with, and control over, the world of perception. Ideas, on the other hand, have their psychogenetic origin in the fact that it is important not only to know what and where things are, but what things may be expected to do. From this point of view, the fixed objects of the environment are relatively unimportant, because they present few, if any, alternatives. The subject-thing, however, always presents a number of possibilities which, because of the alternatives involved, render the issue problematical. Now under 'imitation' we pointed out one large group of social interests, those, namely, in which all the members of the group were alike interested. Here we found the material of imitation.[21] Imitation, we saw, works upon and within the limits of the individual's congenital endowment, and stimulates to activity processes which eventuate in similar overt actions. The phenomena of play may be cited in illustration. Imitative activity, that is, is socially controlled. The end is determined from the beginning, and its causation lies in the psychophysical mechanism which is inherited.

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first, important; but the ability to be guided by the one or the other in practise. So we may say that the perceptual gradually fades into the imaginary for primitive man, in much the same way as he fails to distinguish between his waking and dream life. The world of imagination, as the world of perception, provides for the primitive races an objective field for action. The genetic progression from perception to imagination may be indicated briefly as follows: In *perception* we have the determination of objects in space together with the relations which depend upon the perceptions themselves. The *after-image*, of which the positive form is directly important here, illustrates the possibility of the continuance of the objects of perception when some of the conditions of perception are absent. What we may call the *sense-image*, by which is meant the sensed presence of objects in our environment which have not for the purpose of the present behavior been perceived, indicates that there is a form of control by present objects, although the conditions of perception are entirely inoperative. The blind, perhaps, are guided by this form of imagination, but it is not wanting to those who have all their senses. The *image* presents the object of perception freed, wholly or in part, from its support in the contextual world of perception. It is a movable item of experience capable of entering into any combination according to the practical or theoretical need of the moment.

[21] *Per contra cf.* Baldwin, 'Social and Ethical Interpretations,' 4th ed., p. 504 ff. Our disagreement with this author does not extend to the denial that 'thought' may or does become the matter of social organization, but that there is no social organization without it, that is, prior to the stage of development at which 'thought' emerges. If Baldwin's statement is correct, 'thought' must be present from the start, a supposition which subverts the whole genetic interest and inquiry.

But, from the standpoint of the group, it is equally important to provide the conditions which make variation possible. Social variation is the same fact, from another side, as individual initiative. Here we enter distinctively the social or sociological field. Sociological phenomena are concrete situations in which the individual's reactions are undetermined. The image, therefore, can be of no service here. We need a new instrument for the control of such situations. Common speech indicates as much. Suppose we were asked what we would do under such and such extraordinary circumstances, and the answer of each of us would likely be, 'I have not the least idea.' 'Idea' in the answer, corresponds to 'do' in the question, and both indicate a relation. We are called upon to solve a social problem, and our answer must be some form or other of action[22] through which the relations within the group are put in a new equilibrium.. In this form of imagination, consequently, the individual makes a difference to society, as in imitation society makes a difference to the indivdual. As in imitation society gets its way with me, so in imagination (ideation) I get, *pro hac vice,* my way with society. Ideas, then, are instruments for the control of society. It is through ideas that social strains and stresses are resolved. Now, do ideas ever get freed from their dependence upon concrete situations, and are they ever anything more than answers to particular needs? In other words, do ideas ever become ideals? If so, we may make our way from sociability to morality, in which the free idea functions and controls both the individual and the group in themselves and in their relations to one another. This is possible; we may say, it is probable. The question, however, must be left with the statement; the limits of the present discussion have been already reached.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Introduction to Philosophy. GEORGE S. FULLERTON. New York: The Macmillan Co; London: Macmillan & Co. 1906. Pp. xiii + 322.

An introduction to philosophy, because it is to be used by young students of the subject, should be above all things a clear and interesting outline of the main questions to be dealt with, a manual of practical directions as to how to proceed and what to expect, and an indication of both the method to be pursued and the sort of solutions to be reached in philosophical investigations. It need not necessarily contain a carefully grounded and elaborated system, although it should leave no doubt in the

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[22] *Cf.* Wundt's statement, *Jedes Denken ein Wollen,* 'System des Philosophie,' p. 42.